On April 17, 2012, the Appellate Division ruled that an expert opinion related to the possession of cocaine by the defendant with intent to distribute cocaine was improper because it was expressed in a manner directly commenting on the defendant's guilt. Generally, the opinion of an expert in a drug distribution case should be expressed in hypothetical terms. However, in Jones, the expert specifically used the defendant by name in his testimony and expressed a direct opinion as to defendant's obvious guilt. The Appellate Division found this to be plain error and vacated defendant's conviction. This case provides an excellent review of the parameters for the use of expert testimony in a criminal drug distribution prosecution.
View the full case including Facts, Procedural History, Holding, At Trial and On Appeal.
Thursday, April 26, 2012
Monday, April 23, 2012
State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141 (2011)
Facts:
• Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely.
• While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely.
• At trial, the State moved to admit Defendant's comment. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae."
• During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence.
• On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial.
Analysis:
• The underlying danger of admitting other-crime evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant because he is a bad person in general. The prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is introduced for some purpose other than to suggest that because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it is more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial.
• Rule 404(b) seeks to strike a balance between the prejudice to a defendant that is inherent in other-crimes evidence and the recognition that the evidence may be highly relevant to prove a defendant's guilt of the crime charged. Evidence of uncharged misconduct would be inadmissible if offered solely to prove the defendant's criminal disposition, but if that misconduct evidence is material to a non-propensity purpose such as those listed in Rule 404(b), it may be admissible if its probative value is not outweighed by the risk of prejudice.
• The court relied on State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). In Cofield, the Court articulated the following four-part test to determine if evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible at trial:
1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue;
• the evidence must have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. The evidence must also bear on a material issue in dispute, such as motive, intent, or an element of the charged offense, and so the Court should consider whether the matter was projected by the defense as arguable before trial, raised by the defense at trial, or was one that the defense refused to concede.
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing;
• the prosecution must establish that the act of uncharged misconduct which it seeks to introduce into evidence actually happened by “clear and convincing” evidence.
4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
• It is typically considered the most difficult to overcome. Because of the damaging nature of such evidence, the trial court must engage in a careful and pragmatic evaluation of the evidence to determine whether the probative worth of the evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice. That standard is more exacting than Rule 403, which provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. And, “[i]f other less prejudicial evidence may be presented to establish the same issue, the balance in the weighing process will tip in favor of exclusion.”
• The court stated that limiting instructions must be provided to inform the jury of the purposes for which it may, and for which it may not, consider the evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct, both when the evidence is first presented and again as part of the final jury charge. A suitable limiting instruction explain[s] precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere.
Holding:
• The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, and held that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements.
• The Supreme Court held that a straightforward application of Rule 404(b) lead to the conclusion that defendant suffered no error due to the admission of the disputed evidence about his former indictment (and incarceration pending trial) on charges that he had attempted the murder of the victim in his present trial.
• The court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ...
• The Court directed trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings.
Please visit the site of New Jersey Criminal lawyer, Jeffrey Hark for more information on criminal matters in NJ and more cases like this.
• Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely.
• While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely.
• At trial, the State moved to admit Defendant's comment. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae."
• During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence.
• On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial.
Analysis:
• The underlying danger of admitting other-crime evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant because he is a bad person in general. The prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is introduced for some purpose other than to suggest that because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it is more probable that he committed the crime for which he is on trial.
• Rule 404(b) seeks to strike a balance between the prejudice to a defendant that is inherent in other-crimes evidence and the recognition that the evidence may be highly relevant to prove a defendant's guilt of the crime charged. Evidence of uncharged misconduct would be inadmissible if offered solely to prove the defendant's criminal disposition, but if that misconduct evidence is material to a non-propensity purpose such as those listed in Rule 404(b), it may be admissible if its probative value is not outweighed by the risk of prejudice.
• The court relied on State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). In Cofield, the Court articulated the following four-part test to determine if evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible at trial:
1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue;
• the evidence must have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. The evidence must also bear on a material issue in dispute, such as motive, intent, or an element of the charged offense, and so the Court should consider whether the matter was projected by the defense as arguable before trial, raised by the defense at trial, or was one that the defense refused to concede.
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing;
• the prosecution must establish that the act of uncharged misconduct which it seeks to introduce into evidence actually happened by “clear and convincing” evidence.
4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
• It is typically considered the most difficult to overcome. Because of the damaging nature of such evidence, the trial court must engage in a careful and pragmatic evaluation of the evidence to determine whether the probative worth of the evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice. That standard is more exacting than Rule 403, which provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. And, “[i]f other less prejudicial evidence may be presented to establish the same issue, the balance in the weighing process will tip in favor of exclusion.”
• The court stated that limiting instructions must be provided to inform the jury of the purposes for which it may, and for which it may not, consider the evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct, both when the evidence is first presented and again as part of the final jury charge. A suitable limiting instruction explain[s] precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere.
Holding:
• The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, and held that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements.
• The Supreme Court held that a straightforward application of Rule 404(b) lead to the conclusion that defendant suffered no error due to the admission of the disputed evidence about his former indictment (and incarceration pending trial) on charges that he had attempted the murder of the victim in his present trial.
• The court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ...
• The Court directed trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings.
Please visit the site of New Jersey Criminal lawyer, Jeffrey Hark for more information on criminal matters in NJ and more cases like this.
Friday, April 6, 2012
Albert W. FLORENCE, Petitioner v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF The COUNTY OF BURLINGTON et al.
2012 WL 1069092
Facts:
• Petitioner was arrested during a traffic stop by a New Jersey state trooper who checked a statewide computer database and found a bench warrant issued for petitioner's arrest after he failed to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine.
• He was initially detained in the Burlington County Detention Center and then to the Essex County Correctional Facility where he, like every incoming detainee, had to shower with a delousing agent and was checked for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as he disrobed. Petitioner claims that he also had to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. Petitioner claims that he was also required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough while squatting.
• He was released once it was determined that the fine had been paid.
• He filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Federal District Court against the government entities that ran the jails and other defendants, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and arguing that persons arrested for minor offenses cannot be subjected to invasive searches unless prison officials have reason to suspect concealment of weapons, drugs, or other contraband.
• The court granted him summary judgment, ruling that “strip-searching” nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment. Counties appealed.
• The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Certiorari was granted.
• The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.
Holding:
• The Supreme Court held that searches did not violate Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue:
• Whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband.
Analysis:
• The U. S. Supreme Court opined that maintaining safety and order at detention centers requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to problems. A regulation impinging on an inmate's constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
• The court found that the prison policy of searches in this case was reasonably related to legitimate security interests in prisons. The task of determining whether prison policy is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is peculiarly within province and professional expertise of corrections officials.
• In this case, the correctional officials devised reasonable search policies to detect and deter possession of contraband in their facilities. The correctional officials had a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process.
• Security Interest outweighed the inmate’s constitutional rights:
o The admission of new inmates creates risks for staff, the existing detainee population, and the new detainees themselves. Officials therefore must screen for contagious infections and for wounds or injuries requiring immediate medical attention.
o It may be difficult to identify and treat medical problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection. Jails and prisons also face potential gang violence, giving them reasonable justification for a visual inspection of detainees for signs of gang affiliation as part of the intake process.
o Correctional officials have to detect weapons, drugs, alcohol, and other prohibited items new detainees may possess. Drugs can make inmates aggressive toward officers or each other, and drug trading can lead to violent confrontations.
o Contraband has value in a jail's culture and underground economy, and competition for scarce goods can lead to violence, extortion, and disorder.
o Classifying inmates by their current and prior offenses before the intake search is impossible because jail officials know little at the outset about an arrestee, who may be carrying a false ID or lie about his identity.
Holding:
• Strip searching” of nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
To read this case in its entirety visit our Criminal Law website.
Facts:
• Petitioner was arrested during a traffic stop by a New Jersey state trooper who checked a statewide computer database and found a bench warrant issued for petitioner's arrest after he failed to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine.
• He was initially detained in the Burlington County Detention Center and then to the Essex County Correctional Facility where he, like every incoming detainee, had to shower with a delousing agent and was checked for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as he disrobed. Petitioner claims that he also had to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. Petitioner claims that he was also required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough while squatting.
• He was released once it was determined that the fine had been paid.
• He filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Federal District Court against the government entities that ran the jails and other defendants, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and arguing that persons arrested for minor offenses cannot be subjected to invasive searches unless prison officials have reason to suspect concealment of weapons, drugs, or other contraband.
• The court granted him summary judgment, ruling that “strip-searching” nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment. Counties appealed.
• The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Certiorari was granted.
• The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.
Holding:
• The Supreme Court held that searches did not violate Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue:
• Whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband.
Analysis:
• The U. S. Supreme Court opined that maintaining safety and order at detention centers requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to problems. A regulation impinging on an inmate's constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
• The court found that the prison policy of searches in this case was reasonably related to legitimate security interests in prisons. The task of determining whether prison policy is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is peculiarly within province and professional expertise of corrections officials.
• In this case, the correctional officials devised reasonable search policies to detect and deter possession of contraband in their facilities. The correctional officials had a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process.
• Security Interest outweighed the inmate’s constitutional rights:
o The admission of new inmates creates risks for staff, the existing detainee population, and the new detainees themselves. Officials therefore must screen for contagious infections and for wounds or injuries requiring immediate medical attention.
o It may be difficult to identify and treat medical problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection. Jails and prisons also face potential gang violence, giving them reasonable justification for a visual inspection of detainees for signs of gang affiliation as part of the intake process.
o Correctional officials have to detect weapons, drugs, alcohol, and other prohibited items new detainees may possess. Drugs can make inmates aggressive toward officers or each other, and drug trading can lead to violent confrontations.
o Contraband has value in a jail's culture and underground economy, and competition for scarce goods can lead to violence, extortion, and disorder.
o Classifying inmates by their current and prior offenses before the intake search is impossible because jail officials know little at the outset about an arrestee, who may be carrying a false ID or lie about his identity.
Holding:
• Strip searching” of nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
To read this case in its entirety visit our Criminal Law website.
Monday, April 2, 2012
New Jersey Criminal Case LAFLER v. COOPER
Facts:
Respondent was charged under Michigan law with assault with intent to murder and three other offenses.
Procedural History:
Holding:
Please visit the site of New Jersey Criminal lawyer, Jeffrey Hark for more information on criminal matters in NJ and more cases like this.
Respondent was charged under Michigan law with assault with intent to murder and three other offenses.
- The prosecution offered to dismiss two of the charges and to recommend a 51-to-85-month sentence on the other two, in exchange for a guilty plea.
- Respondent rejected the offer, allegedly after his attorney convinced him that the prosecution would be unable to establish intent to murder because the victim had been shot below the waist.
- At trial, respondent was convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum 185-to-360-month sentence.
Procedural History:
- In a subsequent hearing, the state trial court rejected respondent’s claim that his attorney’s advice to reject the plea constituted ineffective assistance.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the ineffective-assistance claim on the ground that respondent knowingly and intelligently turned down the plea offer and chose to go to trial.
- Finding that the state appellate court had unreasonably applied the constitutional effective assistance standards laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, the District Court granted a conditional writ and ordered specific performance of the original plea offer.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying Strickland, it found that counsel had provided deficient performance by advising respondent of an incorrect legal rule, and that respondent suffered prejudice because he lost the opportunity to take the more favorable sentence offered in the plea.
Holding:
- The Supreme Court held that where counsel’s ineffective advice led to an offer’s rejection, and where the prejudice alleged is having to stand trial, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice, there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the actual judgment and sentence imposed.
Please visit the site of New Jersey Criminal lawyer, Jeffrey Hark for more information on criminal matters in NJ and more cases like this.
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