25 People Arrested in NJ Child Porn Sting

The suspect's range in age from 17 to 66 years old.

By Kelly Bayliss and Monique Braxton

Posted by: Sex Crime Attorney, Jeffery Hark on behalf of NBC10 Philadelphia

NBC10.com - Monique Braxton

After a three-month investigation, officials arrested more than two dozen men in a statewide child pornography sweep called "Operation Ever Vigilant." The suspects had sexually explicit videos of children on their computers and distributed them to others, according to New Jersey Attorney General Jeffrey Chiesa. NBC10's Monique Braxton reports.

 

Twenty-five people were arrested last week on child pornography charges in New Jersey.

The child porn sweep, dubbed Operation Ever Vigilant, began three months ago with a focus on uncovering the distribution of videos and other illegal materials.

New Jersey State Police announced this morning that 25 arrests were made with the suspects ranging in age from 17 to 66 years old in 11 counties. 

The victims range in age from toddlers to 10-year-olds, according to the officials.

In a news conference this morning, Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa referred to the children as victims of torture, saying that the videos and pictures uncovered show necrophilia, defined as sexual attraction for or intercourse with dead bodies, and beastiality -- mostly adults assaulting children. 

Of the 25 arrested, five of the men had direct contact with children. Some were even babysitters, said Chiesa.

Four of the suspects are living in the country illegally, according to the A.G.

All of the men are facing mulitple charges.

Here are the names of the 25 suspects:

Stephen Rainone, 27, Louis Cedeno, 46, David Laidlow, 36, Ernest Okhtenberg, 39, Michael Suscreba, 66, Nill Choudhury, 23, James Engle, 28, Albert Fermiano, 30, Frank Fiorelli, 61, Joseph Lorz, 26, Jose Oswaldo, 39, Alfred Bakewell, 64, Moses Garcia, 25, Alexander Ramirez, 36, Jose Holgiun, 59, Brent Aliff, 38, Stephen Anan, 52, Ryan Bronchella, 34, Christopher Brondi, 57, Manuel Sanchez-Olivaroz, 37, Duane Bell, 43, Giovanni Jimenez, 37, William Payton II, 20, Frank Syak and a 17-year-old male.

More Coverage On this Story:
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/25-People-Arrest-in-NJ-Child-Porn-Sting-193595161.html

http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=9009126

http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/02/27/police-to-announce-numerous-child-porn-arrests-in-new-jersey/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/02/28/NJ-arrests-25-on-kid-porn-charges/UPI-71061362034134/?spt=hs&or=tn

http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Child-Porn-Arrest-Ring-New-Jersey-193546861.html

http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news&id=9009225

http://gloucestertownship.patch.com/articles/sicklerville-clementon-men-arrested-in-child-porn-sting

http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/02/27/more-than-two-dozen-arrested-in-statewide-child-porn-bust-in-new-jersey/

http://hackettstown.patch.com/articles/budd-lake-man-among-25-arrested-in-child-porn-sting

http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/Police_arrest_suspects_in_child_pornography_ring_in_Bergen_and_Passaic_counties.html

http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/item/51608-25-suspects-rounded-up-in-nj-child-porn-crackdown-?linktype=hp_topstorylist

http://nj1015.com/child-porn-operation-nets-25-arrests/

http://articles.philly.com/2013-02-27/news/37333098_1_camden-county-mercer-county-monmouth-county

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/50975022/ns/local_news-philadelphia_pa/#.US-AjzCG0Vs

http://www.myfoxmemphis.com/story/21413953/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation

http://www.njherald.com/story/21422606/budd-lake-man-24-others-arrested-in-statewide-child-porn-investigation

http://gothamist.com/2013/02/27/25_arrested_in_nj_child_porn_crackd.php

http://rumson.patch.com/articles/rumson-man-among-25-charged-in-child-porn-sting

http://collingswood.patch.com/articles/four-from-camden-co-arrested-in-statewide-child-porn-sting

http://www.njsp.org/news/pr022713.html

http://www.nj.com/camden/index.ssf/2013/02/child_porn_dragnet_operation_e.html

http://ns1.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/child-porn-sting-25-arrested-in-nj-for-possessiondistribution-of-child-pornography

http://springfield.patch.com/articles/clark-man-arrested-for-possessing-distributing-child-porn

http://www.state.nj.us/lps/newsreleases13/pr20130227a.html

http://www.app.com/article/CN/20130227/NJNEWS14/302270032/Child-porn-sting-results-arrest-25-men

http://njtoday.net/2013/02/27/state-announces-25-child-porn-arrests/

http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/20130228_25_are_arrested_in_child-porn_sweep.html

http://www.trentonian.com/article/20130227/NEWS01/130229681/authorities-bust-huge-network-of-child-pornography

http://www.mycentraljersey.com/article/CN/20130227/NJNEWS14/302270032/Child-porn-sting-results-arrest-25-men

http://longbranch.patch.com/articles/west-long-branch-police-aid-in-statewide-child-pornography-roundup

http://www.myfoxaustin.com/story/21413953/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation

http://news.yahoo.com/video/25-arrested-jersey-child-porn-173404198.html

http://www.newsday.com/news/region-state/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation-1.4719033

http://newjersey.news12.com/news/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation-1.4721125?qr=1

http://abcnewsradioonline.com/national-news/child-porn-ring-busted-in-new-jersey.html

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http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/02/27/25-arrested-in-nj-child-porn-possession-sweep/


 

Denial of Due Process

On February  7, 2013, the New Jersey Appellate Division decided the case State v. Gibson  (Docket No. A-5163-10T2) and found that the municipal court erred by relying on evidence from a suppression hearing during defendant’s trial on the merits. By doing this, the defendant was denied his due process rights.

Posted by: New Jersey Criminal Lawyer, Jeffery Hark

            The defendant, Bruno Gibson, was arrested by Winslow Township Police for DUI on November 17, 2007. The defendant’s suppression hearing was conducted on May 26, 2010 in municipal court. At the suppression hearing, the defendant argued that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his motor vehicle and also lacked probable cause to arrest him for DUI. The municipal court judge heard testimony from the arresting officer that he pulled the defendant over because he was speeding and failed to use his turn signal. Also, the officer stated that he detected an alcoholic odor and that defendant admitted to drinking. The officer then explained that the defendant was ordered to submit to field sobriety testing and that he performed poorly on the one legged stand and walk and turn test. The suppression hearing continued on October 27, 2010 and the defense introduced video footage of the stop to refute the officer’s testimony. The municipal court then determined that the officers had probable cause to stop and arrest the defendant. After that, the municipal court judge proceeded to conduct defendant’s trial on the merits. The municipal prosecutor explained to the judge that they did not have access to defendant’s blood reading and that they would rely on the officer’s observations. The defense counsel then moved to dismiss due to the absence of evidence. The municipal court found defendant guilty of DUI and failing to signal. The municipal judge relied on defendant’s performance on the two field sobriety tests and his post arrest demeanor and behavior.

            The defendant then appealed his conviction and the Law Division conducted a de novo trial. The Law Division judge distinguished State v. Allan, 283 N.J. Super. 622 (Law Div. 1995) (which held that a municipal court should not rely on the suppression hearing in trial on the merits unless defendant receives notice and consents)  from the defendant’s case.  The Law Division Judge found that defendant did not object to a trial based on evidence at the suppression hearing and also failed to show how he was prejudiced by the municipal court procedures. Based on this, the Law Division did not change defendant’s municipal court sentence.

            The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Division. The defendant argued that the State never proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt specifically because the state presented no evidence at trial and even if the evidence at the probable cause hearing is deemed to be admissible at trial, the State did not have enough to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court specifically discussed the Law Division’s findings and explained that the defendant did in fact object to the use of suppression hearing evidence because defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges. The Appellate Court then went into detail about how a suppression hearing is distinctly different from a trial on the merits. Specially, since the trial on the merits determines a defendant’s guilt and in contrast the suppression hearing determines if evidence is admissible based on the lawfulness of police conduct.  Also, the standard of proof at trial is beyond a reasonable doubt but during a suppression hearing the state must by a preponderance of the evidence show that officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant, and probable cause to arrest.

            The Appellate Court also took issue with the fact that the State never presented any evidence during defendant’s trial, considering that the State has the burden of proof of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

             The Appellate Court found that the municipal court reliance of pre-trial hearing evidence violated the defendant’s right to procedural due process and fundamental fairness. Thus, the Appellate Court ruled that a court cannot be empowered over defendant’s objection, to consider pre-trial suppression hearing evidence in the trial on the merits; and simply proceed to closing arguments without asking defense counsel if he intends to call the defendant and/or witnesses.

Proposed Changes to New Jersey Drunk Driving Law

Major Changes Proposed to New Jersey Drunk Driving Law  

Submitted by NJ DWI Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark.

Senate Bill 2427 introduced on January 8, 2013 would require all drunk driving offenders to install an ignition interlock device in any motor vehicle that he or she owns, leases, or primarily operates for a set duration. If the drunk driving offender does not have access to a motor vehicle then he or she would lose their driving privileges for the set duration.

Proposed Changes for DWI Conviction - First Time Offenders

          Specifically, the bill would require a first time offenders to install a ignition interlock device in their vehicle for three to six months if they were found to have a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) greater than .08% but less than .10%. If the first time offender’s BAC is greater than .10% then the device would have to be installed in their vehicle for seven months to one year. A second time drunk driving offender would have to install the device for two to four years. A third or subsequent offender would be required to have the device installed for ten to twenty years.

Proposed Changesfor DWI Conviction - Second and Subsequent Time Offenders

          The bill would drastically change the law for second, third and subsequent time offenders. Under current law a second time offender faces a suspension of their driving privileges for two years. The bill would increase that suspension period to two to four years. For third or subsequent time offenders, current law requires a suspension for ten years, the bill would require a suspension for ten to twenty years. The bill also changes the time a third or subsequent offender can spend in a inpatient rehabilitation program in lieu of going to jail. Under current law,  a third or subsequent offender can serve up to 90 days in a inpatient program instead of prison. The bill would allow third or subsequent offenders to serve up to 180 days in a inpatient program instead of jail time.

          Under the bill, a offender who fails to install a court ordered motor vehicle device would be charged with a disorderly person’s offense and have their driving privileges suspended for an additional year. Also, offenders who are required to have interlock device installed in their vehicle can be charged with a disorderly person’s offense and suspension of their license for an additional year if they are found to have started their vehicle by any means other than blowing into the device themselves. Also, offenders who drive someone else’s vehicle can face a disorderly and have their license suspended for an additional year.  

Drug Issues Case NJ Supreme court

State v. Earls 420 N.J. Super. 583 (App Div. 2011)

Posted by: New Jersey Criminal Lawyer, Jeffery Hark

Relevant Facts:

The defendant was suspected of committing numerous residential burglaries. Officers obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant and couldn’t locate him. Thus, the police contacted T–Mobile, which was defendant's cell phone carrier. T–Mobile was able to determine defendant's general location at any given time because every seven seconds, a cell phone scans for the strongest signal, which is usually from the nearest tower, and then registers with that tower by sending in a signal to identify itself. Officers contact T-Mobile to get defendant’s exact location. After the third contact with T-Mobile, officers located defendant's car in a motel parking lot and subsequently arrested the defendant.

The trial court determined during a suppression hearing:

That a person generally would have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in preventing his cell phone provider from disclosing the general area where he is located, but that the police inquiries to T–Mobile concerning defendant's whereabouts were justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement because the police had an objectively reasonable basis for believing defendant planned to cause physical harm to Gates. Therefore, the court concluded that the police “lawfully obtained” information about defendant's presence in the general area of the motel and thus lawfully entered defendant's motel room to arrest him.

The Defendant on appeal argued:

That the monitoring of defendant's cell phone location was not justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, and the police used information obtained from T–Mobile concerning the location of his cell phone to assist in determining where he could be found, the evidence found in the motel room must be suppressed as a fruit of the illegal search of his cell phone information.

The Appellate Division discussed two United States Supreme Court cases that specifically found that the use of beepers and other electronic tracking device used to track defendants did not violate their fourth amendment rights:

The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the validity of electronic tracking of a criminal suspect in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). In that case, the government obtained information that three individuals were engaged in the manufacture of illicit drugs.Id. at 278, 103 S.Ct. at 1083, 75 L.Ed.2d at 59–60. One of the chemicals used in this manufacturing process was chloroform. Ibid. With the consent of the seller of the chloroform, the government installed a beeper in a container of chloroform that was subsequently sold to one of the participants in the drug manufacturing enterprise, Armstrong, who drove his car to the residence of another participant, Petschen, and transferred the container to his car. Ibid.Petschen then drove his car to a cabin occupied by the third participant, defendant Knotts. Ibid. The government was able to track the transportation of chloroform first to Petschen's house and then to Knotts's cabin by means of intermittent visual surveillance of Armstrong's and Petschen's cars and also by the electronic signals emanating from the beeper. Ibid. Based partly on that evidence, the government obtained a warrant for the search of Knotts's cabin, which revealed evidence that resulted in his conviction for a drug offense. Id. at 279, 103 S.Ct. at 1084, 75 L.Ed.2d at 60. The court stated that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” Id. at 281, 103 S.Ct. at 1085, 75 L.Ed.2d at 62. The court reasoned that the movements of Armstrong's and Petschen's cars that eventually led the police to Knotts's cabin could have been tracked through visual surveillance on public roads and that the “enhancement” of natural, visual surveillance capabilities with the use of “science and technology” did not raise a Fourth Amendment problem. Id. at 282, 103 S.Ct. at 1086, 75 L.Ed.2d at 63.

 

The Court next addressed the issue of electronic tracking in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). In that case, the government was told by an informant that Karo and three confederates had ordered from him fifty gallons of ether, which is used to extract cocaine from clothing. Id. at 708, 104 S.Ct. at 3299, 82 L.Ed.2d at 537. With the informant's consent, the government installed a beeper in one of the cans used to transport the ether. Ibid. For the **122 next five *596 months, the government used the beeper, together with visual surveillance, to track the movement of the ether. Id. at 708–10, 104 S.Ct. at 3300, 82 L.Ed.2d at 537–38. During part of this time, the ether was stored in public storage facilities and at other times in private residences. Ibid. The ether was eventually transported to a private residence in Taos, New Mexico. Id. at 709, 104 S.Ct. at 3300, 82 L.Ed.2d at 538.Based partly on evidence obtained through use of the beeper, the government secured a warrant to search the Taos residence. Id. at 710, 104 S.Ct. at 3300, 82 L.Ed.2d at 538. The execution of this warrant revealed cocaine and drug paraphernalia. Ibid. The lower federal courts invalidated the warrant on the ground that it was obtained based on information revealed by the beeper. Id. at 710, 104 S.Ct. at 3301, 82 L.Ed.2d at 538. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Knotts that the use of a beeper or other electronic tracking device for surveillance of a suspect's or contraband's movements along highways or in other public places does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 714–15, 104 S.Ct. at 3302–03, 82L.Ed.2d at 540–42. The Court also concluded that the government had obtained sufficient evidence through such means to uphold the validity of the warrant for the search of the Taos residence. Id. at 719–21, 104 S.Ct. at 3305–06, 82 L.Ed.2d at 544–45. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that “it is evident that under Knotts there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment” in the use of the beeper to monitor the movement of the truck on public highways until it reached the Taos residence. Id. at 721, 104 S.Ct. at 3306, 82 L.Ed.2d at 545.

 

The Appellate Division also looked at  other jurisdictions application of the law to similar facts:

Courts in other jurisdictions have relied upon Knotts in concluding that the use of information derived from a suspect's cell phone to determine his general location does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950–52 (6th Cir.2004), remanded on unrelated sentencing grounds, 543 U.S. 1100, 125 S.Ct. 1050, 160 L.Ed.2d 1001 (2005); Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293, 300–01 (2010); Stone v. State, 178 Md.App.428, 941 A.2d 1238, 1249–50 (2008).

 

 

The Appellate Division found that:

The defendant had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in preventing T–Mobile from disclosing information concerning the general location of his cell phone. Therefore, we uphold the validity of defendant's arrest based partly on that information without considering the applicability of the emergency aid exception.

 The use by the police of information obtained from T–Mobile concerning defendant's general location, derived from signals emitted by his cell phone, which together with visual surveillance resulted in discovery of his car in a motel parking lot, did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy defendant may have had regarding the location of his car.

That a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on public highways or the general location of their cell phone, and therefore, there is no basis in this context for construing the New Jersey Constitution more expansively than the Fourth Amendment.

We only hold that the Middletown police did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution in utilizing the cell-site information provided by T–Mobile to assist in locating defendant to execute the warrant for his arrest.

 

This Case was appealed to the NJ Supreme Court and arguments were heard last week.

Failure to Obey a Legal Command

State v. Rue Not Reported in A.3d, 2013 WL 195520 (App. Div. 2013)

Posted by: New Jersey Criminal Lawyer, Jeffery Hark

On March 15, 2007, two officers were patrolling in a high crime area in Trenton. The officers saw an Oldsmobile stopped in a driveway and a person was leaning into the passenger window. The person that was leaning was recognized by police as a drug offender. The officers stopped their car and shined a flashlight onto the stopped vehicle. The drug offender began walking away and one of the officers went to detain him. The other officer approached the Oldsmobile and before he could get to the vehicle, the driver, who was later determined to be defendant Rue, began to drive out of the driveway. The officer twice commanded the driver (Rue) to stop the car, which defendant ignored. The defendant drove onto the street and the officer followed behind. The officer eventually caught up to the defendant’s vehicle and turned on his overhead lights. At this point, the defendant did not proceed further. The officer then approached the defendant’s car and he saw defendant put his hands near his waistband. The officer commanded the defendant to show his hands, which he initially ignored. The officer was concerned that the defendant might have a weapon so he ordered the defendant to out of his car. Defendant stepped out of the car and put his hands on the roof of his car and at this time, several bundles of heroin fell to the ground out of his pant leg. The officer recovered forty-nine glassine bags of heroin.

At the suppression hearing the defendant testified that he never heard the officer command him to stop when he was pulling his car out of the driveway.

The trial judge found the officer’s testimony to be credible. The trial judge concluded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to effect a temporary investigative detention of defendant in the driveway only because defendant was stopped in his car and speaking to a known drug offender. However, the judge concluded that defendant's failure to obey Maxwell's command to stop provided at least reasonable suspicion justifying the officer's subsequent stop of his car at the traffic light and detention of defendant for the offense of obstruction.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress based on its application of the attenuation doctrine as discussed by the Supreme Court in　State v. Marcellus Williams,　192　N.J.　1, 15 (2007). In reliance on that case, the judge concluded that the obstruction offense was an intervening circumstance that dissipated the taint of the initial unconstitutional command to stop, and, therefore, the seizure of heroin resulting from the motor vehicle stop did not violate defendant's constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Consequently, Defendant Jason Rue pleaded guilty to illegal drug charges in two indictments. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.

The Appellate Division relied on two case, State v. Robert Williams,　410　N.J.Super.　549 (App.Div.2009),　certif. denied,　201　N.J.　440 (2010) and State v. Shaw,　–––　N.J.　–––– (2012), that were decided after the trial court’s ruling in this case. The Appellate Division decided that based on these two cases, that the trial court ruling must be reversed, and the heroin evidence must be suppressed.

In　Robert Williams,　the appellate division held that an unconstitutional order to a fleeing person to stop was not attenuated by the suspect's continuing his flight and thus his obstruction offense.　Robert Williams, supra,　410　N.J.Super.at 564. In the Williams case the appellate division found that the defendant's brief flight on a bicycle from a police command to stop did not give officers reasonable suspicion to detain him. Writing for the court, Judge Skillman considered the three factors of the attenuation doctrine and rejected the State's argument that a defendant's flight is automatically an "intervening circumstance" that dissipates the taint of the initial police conduct.　Id.　at 559–60.　Judge Skillman concluded that, where the defendant did nothing more than violate the obstruction statute by failing to heed a police command to stop, the State did not demonstrate "significant attenuation" of the unconstitutional police conduct.　Id.　at 564.

Additionally, the Supreme Court's December 2012 decision in　Shaw, supra,　–––　N.J.　––––, set stricter limits on the attenuation doctrine. In　Shaw,　the police were attempting to execute a warrant for a fugitive at the apartment complex were he lived. The defendant walked out of the building. Defendant was not the fugitive but, like him, was an African–American man.　Id.　at –––– (slip op. at 12). The police did not see the defendant do anything to suggest he might be involved in criminal activity.　Ibid.　When an officer asked for his name, the defendant refused to identify himself and attempted to walk away.　Id.　at –––– (slip op. at 13). The police detained him to determine his identity. After only a few minutes, other officers arrived and confirmed that the defendant was not the fugitive they were seeking, but they also revealed that an arrest warrant existed for the defendant for an unrelated parole violation. Incident to the defendant's arrest on the parole warrant, drugs were found on his person.　Id.　at –––– (slip op. at 14). In his prosecution on drug charges, the Supreme Court viewed the issue as "whether the drugs found on Shaw were the product of the ‘exploitation’ of the unlawful stop and detention or of a ‘means sufficiently distinguishable’ from the constitutional violation such that the ‘taint’ of the violation was ‘purged.’ "　Id.at –––– (slip op. at 30) (citing　Hudson v. Michigan,　547 U.S. 586, 592, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 165　L. Ed.2d 56, 65 (2006)). The Court held that the existence of the parole warrant was not a sufficient intervening circumstance to dissipate the taint of the initial unconstitutional detention and the subsequent search of the defendant's person incident to his arrest.　Id.　at –––– (slip op. at 42).

　

The appellate court stated that :

"[t]he decisions in　Shaw　and　Robert Williams　lead us to conclude that the disorderly persons offense of fleeing an unconstitutional police command to stop,N.J.S.A.　2C:29–1(b), without more, does not dissipate the taint of the constitutional violation. Especially where the police seized evidence almost immediately and through a direct chain of causation that included their unconstitutional command, the exclusionary rule and the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine require suppression of the evidence."