Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Discovery Rule does Not Excuse Violation of the Two-Year Statute of Limitations


36-2-1081 Zurich American Insurance Company v. Abbud, App. Div. (per curiam) (13 pp.)  
 
The appellate panel affirms, finding the discovery rule inapplicable. It is clear that on August 19, 2005, the facts known to plaintiff were sufficient to start the statute of limitations running. Because plaintiff knew that Bill had been injured, and knew the identity of the responsible party, the trial judge correctly held that the discovery rule did not excuse violation of the two-year statute of limitations.   What the court is saying here is that an attorney who is hired by a client must investigate all aspects of the client's case pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct to protect the client's interest. The 'discovery rule' identified the moment when the attorney knew or should have known that a viable claim has arisen on behalf of the client.  This longstanding principle was first established in Lopez vs. Lopez.   Plaintiff Zurich American Insurance Company, a worker's compensation insurer, as a subrogee of Daniel Bill, appeals from the grant of defendants' summary judgment motion which dismissed plaintiff's medical malpractice complaint because it was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that the "discovery rule," should apply to toll the limitations period. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that it properly employed the fictitious party rule, and its second and third amended complaints naming certain defendants for the first time related back to the timely-filed original complaint, thus avoiding application of the limitations period.  Now because the court has ruled that the attorney was aware of the injury and the identity of the responsible party, that attorney committed malpractice when s/he did not name then directly in the initial law suit. 
 
Submitted New Jersey Attorney, Jeffrey Hark.

Monday, August 19, 2013

New Jersey Assembly Introduces a Bill Which Expands Implied Consent Statute to Include Blood And Urine Testing


A4284 – S2939 Expands Implied Consent Statute to Include Blood And Urine Testing.


            On June 24, 2013 the New Jersey Assembly introduced a bill to expand the implied consent of motor vehicle operators to include blood and urine testing. The bill would amend P.L.1966, c.142 which currently on includes breath. The bill is aimed at giving police more tools when a driver is suspected of driving while intoxicated. The driver would be given a copy of all the information resulting from the breath, blood and/ or urine test. Currently suspected drunk drivers in New Jersey are deemed to have given consent to a breathalyzer test to determine their BAC. Any driver that refuses the breathalyzer is subject to 7-12 months license suspension and a fine of $300-$500 for the first offense; two year suspension and $500-$1000 fine for the second offense; and 10 year suspension and $10,000 fine for the third offense.

A4284 is in response to the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___ (2013), holding police cannot always take warrantless blood tests from suspected drunk drivers under exigent circumstance exception of alcohol dissipating. Suspected drunk drivers could still refuse to give samples and face the consequences in the existing statute outlined above. Police could not forcibly take a sample from a person resisting and pursuant to Section 2(c) of P.L. 1966, c. 142, the suspected drunk driver still has the right to select the person or physician taking the sample.

This amendment if enacted substantial changes the information police would have access to beyond the BAC of the suspected drunk driver. Blood and urine tests would show other influences on the driver, such as, pregnancy, private medical conditions, drugs, both prescription or illegal. Would the blood sample test only be for alcohol? The amendment to the breathalyzer only addresses alcohol, not other substances. And the legislative history states “drunk drivers,” suggesting that if blood and urine samples were used to test for other substances that would be beyond the consented scope of the statute.  The take away, is that if A4284 is enacted, it may infringe on constitutionally protected privacy rights not addressed by the New Jersey Legislator and be constitutionally invalid.

Monday, August 12, 2013

Requirement to Provide Experts


August 12, 2013

Gordon v. Township of Toms River, Appellate Division A-5139-11T1

Requirement to provide experts
Submitted by New Jersey criminal lawyer Jeffrey Hark
 

August 8, 2013, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment against the plaintiff Richard Gordon. On September 27, 2009, Gordon had a few drinks that evening on the Seaside Heights Boardwalk and decided to sleep on the couch at his ex-girlfriend’s home. Upon arrival, he discovered she was not home and called her 14 times, receiving no response he entered the house through the bedroom window. When the plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend returned, she saw his vehicle parked outside and called police. The police arrived with their K-9 officer, Boris and went inside the home. Police made the “K-9 Announcement” and received no response. After a reasonable amount of time Boris was released and apprehended the plaintiff by biting him in his buttocks, right shoulder, left thigh and left calf. The plaintiff was charged with burglary, harassment, stalking and trespassing.

Pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, the plaintiff alleged excessive force and negligence by the police in handling of the K-9 officer. Defendants moved for summary judgment on two arguments 1) the scarring by the dog bites were not substantial within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) and; 2) plaintiff failed to provide expert opinion necessary to establish negligent handling of the K-9 unit. At trial, the judge accepted the medical expert testimony that the dog bites resulted in significant scarring. The plaintiff did not present an expert on proper K-9 unit procedure and the judge thought this was a significant issue. The judge did not think a jury could pass judgment on proper police procedure without a qualified expert and provided the plaintiff an additional 30 days to find an expert. Plaintiff did not provide an expert on police procedure.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision that the plaintiff needed to present an expert on police procedure. Whether or not an expert is required is established in Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982), as to if the matter to be decided is so esoteric that jurors cannot form a valid judgment based on their common experience alone. The plaintiff in this case needed an expert on proper police procedure, his allegation of negligence alone was not sufficient. When most citizens have no personal knowledge of the subject matter at issue, such as how police should conduct themselves and their K-9 units, an expert is helpful to the jury to decide an issue which otherwise would be impossible for the jury to decide. The take away is that already high use of experts in litigation is not going to change in the future.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

“third-party intervention” exception or “private search” doctrine


State v. Wright, Appellate Division A-4813-10T1

“third-party intervention” exception or “private search” doctrine

 
July 25, 2013, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction of a defendant based on evidence obtained under the “third-party intervention” doctrine where police can search a defendant’s property without a warrant, as long as they are within the scope of the private actor’s intrusion. On March 30, 2009, the defendant’s girlfriend had given the landlord permission to enter the property to repair a leaky pipe causing damage in the kitchen and master bedroom. The landlord saw drugs in the bedroom and immediately called the police. Police arrived at the property and observed the leak and the drugs without seizing or searching anything. The tenant, the defendant’s girlfriend, was contacted while police were posted at the bedroom and entrance to the property to preserve evidence. When the girlfriend arrived, she was read her Miranda rights and consented to a search of the property. Police found marijuana, cocaine, a scale, sandwich bags, baking soda, a Pyrex plate with powder residue, a handgun in a backpack, hollow point round and a bag of one hundred bullets. At trial the defendant’s girlfriend denied giving the landlord permission to enter and stated she only consented to a police search because she was scared they would call DYFS.

At trial the judge did not find the defendant’s girlfriend to be a credible witness and that she was attempting to exculpate the defendant who fathered their child and controls her in a domineering relationship. The landlord had a right to be on the property and when the police entered the property they were within the “third-party intervention” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Based on the credibility findings at trial, the record shows no violation of the tenant’s privacy rights. The significant fact the court points to in application of the “third-party intervention” exception is that the police did not go beyond the physical scope of the landlord’s entry until they had the tenant’s consent. Therefore the Appellate Division agreed with the trial judge that the warrantless police search was constitutionally valid and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.

In upholding the conviction, the Appellate Division emphasizes the Fourth Amendment is protection from the government, not searches by private citizens. Hence the “third-party intervention” being synonymous with the “private search” doctrine. In Walter v. United States, 447 U.S., 649 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment violation by the FBI’s receipt of films from a private party. When a private citizen, such as a landlord, searches a property he is motivated by reasons other than securing a criminal conviction. When that private individual is not acting in an illegal manner and his conduct is a reasonably foreseeable intrusion of privacy that conduct will not be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, therefore information resulting from that conduct in not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Information obtained from the “private search” can be transmitted to police; however police are limited to only the initial discovery by the private party. Additional discovery by police beyond the private individual’s initial discovery requires the police have a warrant or consent.

Tuesday, August 6, 2013

New texting and mobile phone restrictions for commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers

Original article posted by the US Department of Transportation:
 
New Rule: Mobile phone use restricted for CMV drivers. New Rule: No texting while operating a CMV. No Call, No Text, No Ticket.
New Rule: Mobile phone use restricted for CMV drivers. New Rule: No texting while operating a CMV. No Call, No Text, No Ticket.

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What You Need to Know



New texting and mobile phone restrictions for commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers

The FMCSA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) have published rules specifically prohibiting interstate truck and bus drivers and drivers who transport placardable quantities of hazardous materials from texting or using hand-held mobile phones while operating their vehicles. The joint rules are the latest actions by the U.S. Department of Transportation to end distracted driving. Violations can result in fines and/or disqualifications and will impact a motor carrier’s and/or driver’s Safety Measurement System (SMS) results.

No texting while driving

CMV drivers are prohibited from texting while driving. So what qualifies as texting? Texting means manually entering alphanumeric text into, or reading text from, an electronic device. This includes, but is not limited to, short message service, e-mailing, instant messaging, a command or request to access a Web page, or pressing more than a single button to initiate or terminate a voice communication using a mobile phone. (Click here for final rule)
Do not type or read a text message while driving a CMV!

Use of mobile phones is restricted for CMV drivers

This ruling restricts a CMV driver from reaching for or holding a mobile phone to conduct a voice communication, as well as dialing bypressing more than a single button. CMV drivers who use a mobile phone while driving can only operate a hands-free phone located in close proximity. In short, the rule prohibits unsafely reaching for a device, holding a mobile phone, or pressing multiple buttons. (Click here for final rule)

How can drivers use a mobile phone and still obey the rules?

  • Locate the mobile phone so it is operable by the driver while restrained by properly adjusted safety belts.
  • Utilize an earpiece or the speaker phone function.
  • Use voice-activated or one-button touch features to initiate, answer, or terminate a call.
It's very easy to comply with the new rules: No REACHING, No HOLDING, No DIALING, No TEXTING, No READING.

What happens if a driver is caught using a hand-held phone or texting while driving?

The rules impose sanctions for driver offenses, including civil penalties up to $2,750 and disqualification for multiple offenses. Motor carriers are also prohibited from requiring or allowing their drivers to text or use a hand-held mobile phone while driving and may be subject to civil penalties up to $11,000. Violations will impact SMS results. Texting and calling on a hand-held phone carry the worst possible violation severity weights against a driver’s results!

What are the risks?

Besides penalties and possible disqualification, recent research shows that the odds of being involved in a safety-critical event (e.g., crash, near-crash, unintentional lane deviation) are 23.2 times greaterfor CMV drivers who text while driving than for those who do not. Texting drivers took their eyes off the road for an average of 4.6 seconds. At 55 mph, this equates to a driver traveling the approximate length of a football field — without looking at the roadway! For CMV drivers who dial a mobile phone while driving, the odds of being involved in a safety-critical event are six times greater than for those who do not. Why take chances?
BOTTOM LINE: Using a hand held device while driving is a serious traffic violation that could result in a disqualification.
No call, no text, no ticket!
Contact Commercial Truck Accident Lawyer Jeffrey Hark if you have questions regarding this new law.

Sunday, August 4, 2013

Prior Traffic Convictions and Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI)


State v. Sharp, App. Div.    
 
New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently agreed with a County prosecutor’s office that prior traffic convictions for Driving while Suspended is a correct reason to deny someone from the county’s PTI program.  Mr. Sharp applied for PTI at the county level after he was indicted for driving while suspended after having been previously convicted in municipal court for numerous (4) prior NJSA 39:3-40 driving while suspended charges.  N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26a and b. is a 4th degree criminalization of serial 3:40 defendants while up to 18 months of incarceration. 
 
After the trial judge Ordered the Prosecutor’s office to admit Mr. Sharp into their PTI program over their objections the state appealed. The appellate panel ruled that the judge erred in finding that the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant PTI admission was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The court agreed with the prosecutor’s office telling them and all other county prosecutors that defendants with numerous prior 3:40 convictions in municipal court are unacceptable candidates for PTI admission based on their terrible driving records, which indicated a pattern of anti-social behavior and lack of amenability to rehabilitation.  
 
As a result, this and all other defendants with numerous prior 39:3-40 convictions, whose cases are referred to the county prosecutor’s office for indictment under NJSA 2C:40-26 (a) and (b) are looking at mandatory jail time, probation, and NO entry into their county’s PTI program. 
 
Submitted by Jeffrey Hark, a new jersey criminal lawyer http://www.harklawnj.com/

Monday, July 29, 2013

Drunk Driving Defense - Mid Trial Discovery Admitted

Published by New Jersey DWI Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark.
http://www.harklawnj.com/new-jersey-dwi-lawyer/
 
June 28, 2013, the Appellate Division affirmed the drunk driving conviction where defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of an Alcohol Influence Report (AIR) because it was submitted after discovery ended. The defendant was appealing his August 12, 2012 conviction for violation of driving while intoxicated (DWI) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and sentenced to the minimum mandatory penalties for a second offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2). On May 19, 2010, defendant was stopped for speeding and the officer smelled alcohol. After a field sobriety test, the defendant was taken to the police station and given a breathalyzer. Defendant had a BAC of 0.12 percent.

Alcohol Influence Report Admitted Mid Trial

At trial the State did not timely provide complete discovery of the Alcohol Influence Report and defense council moved to have any evidence not previously provided precluded. The defense’s specific objection was that the defense was forced to supply information to the State regarding the fatal weakness to which the State was then allowed to cure the deficiency. The judge allowed the State to introduce a foundational witness and a certificate of analysis for the AIR. The Appellate Division found no legal authority for the defendant’s argument that the court was required to exclude evidence based on the State’s failure to present it timely. When evidence is admitted mid trial, there are two factors to consider: 1) did the party have the intention to mislead by not providing it earlier, and 2) is the aggrieved party prejudiced by the inability to contest the evidence because of the late notice.

Without a showing of prejudice to the defense, a blanket order to preclude further discovery is appropriate. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the State to provide the foundational document for the AIR and the police officer to authenticate the document. The defendant did not cite any case law that requiring defense council to specify what foundational documents were lacking violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-17 or N.J.R.E. 501, 502, and 503. The defendant’s argument that they assisted the State with their case because the defendant had to point out the deficiencies does not support that defense of the defendant was impaired. The defense council would not have done anything different in preparation for the case had there been a complete discovery.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL DEFENSE: LEGAL MALPRACTICE


July 16, 2013

State v. Headley, App. Div. A-4256-11T2

EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LEGAL MALPRACTICE MOTION TO SUPPRESS INCULPATORY STATEMENT WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED!!

July 12, 2013, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the trial court and Law Division conviction of Junior A. Headley for possession of burglary tools. On June 28, 2011, the defendant was stopped by Sergeant Kopesky in plain clothes and an unmarked car because he matched the description of a black male, wearing a tee shirt and jeans, riding a bicycle on Ivy Lane casing houses. Sergeant Kopesky questioned the defendant about the tools in his back pocket, to which the defendant stated were for his bike, then changed his answer to a construction job and then changed his answer again that he was working at a nearby church. Police determined the tools did not fit the bike, there was no construction job and police located the church that defendant worked for but according to church administrators the defendant was not there earlier.

To uphold a conviction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-5 possession of burglary tools and specific intent to use tools to steal property is required. The trial court convicted the defendant based his possession of the burglary and the defendant’s inconsistent stories based upon hearsay testimony from Sergeant Kopesky. On appeal to the Law Division, the Law Division judge acknowledged the merit of the Miranda issues but declined consideration because he did not have authority to reverse. Pursuant to Rule 7:5-2(d) the defendant waived his right to object during trial to evidence that was unlawfully obtained when the defendant did not file a suppression motion before the trial.

The Appellate Division reverses because the Law Division judge can “for good cause shown” remand for retrial and erred by not recognizing his authority to reverse and remand. State v. McLendon, 331 N.J. Super. 104, 109 (App. Div. 2000). Also the Appellate Division reverses because although the defendant failed to adequately explain himself to the officer, the failure to give a good account of oneself cannot be made an essential element of a crime nor be proof of an unlawful purpose. The Law Division should also review the hearsay testimony admitted for a Sixth Amendment violation even though no objection by defense at trial. The take away from this case is that the law Division may reverse a case, even when the defense filed no suppression motions pre-trial or made objections at trial, if the reviewing Law Division judge finds “good cause,” such as constitutional issue.

 

Monday, July 15, 2013

Parental Influence of Child Sex Assault Case Jeopardizes Judge’s Decision


14-2-0579 State in the Interests of K.S., App. Div. Docket No. A-0970-11T4

PARENTAL INFLUENCE OF CHILD SEX ASSAULT CASE JEOPARDIZES JUDGE’S DECISION---TAINT--
 

            July 9, 2013 the Appellate Division reversed a ruling of child abuse against K.S., 11 years old at the time of the incident, for allegedly causing K.E., a nine year old, to take his pants down and touch the victim’s buttocks on three separate occasions during the summer of 2010. To convict K.S., the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that K.S. knowingly performed an “indecent, immoral or unlawful act or deed that may have tended to debauch or degrade K.E.’s morals.” State v. Overton, 357 N.J. Super. 387, 393 (App. Div. 2003). The Appellate Division found that the trial judge erred by admitting testimony of the victim’s mother made to her by the victim.

            Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), statements made by a child about a sexual offense may be admitted after the trial judge conducts a preliminary hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(a) to determine that the statement is sufficiently reliable. Reliability is based on “time, content and circumstances of the statement...totality of the circumstances...spontaneity, consistent repetition, mental state of the declarant, use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate.” State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 249 (2010). The Appellate Division held that the trial judge failed to give proper consideration of interrogation and manipulation by adults in admitting the mother’s testimony.

            At trial, the mother testified that her son initially did not tell her about the incidents. The mother continued to question her son over the summer months to obtain more details about the incidents. The Appellate Division found the repeated questioning of the victim by his mother to discount the spontaneity of the statements by the victim. Generally the probative value of statements are stronger when the statements are blurted out rather than dragged out piece by piece over a period of months. There is no exclusive list of factors for a 104(a) hearing but the Appellate Division has emphasized identifying the statement’s spontaneity to find sufficient reliability.

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Sex Crime Summary: SVP-642-12 In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of C.H., App. Div. Docket No. A-2146-12T2

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Domestic Violence Criminal Trial Summary: 14-2-0489 State v. Raimondo, App. Div. Docket No. A-0369-11T3


In State v. Raimondo at the trial level, the defendant was convicted of third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a (count one); fourth-degree possession of an illegal butterfly knife and/or a switchblade, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3e (count two); a fourth-degree certain persons weapons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7a (count three) and petty disorderly persons offense of harassment.  The case arises out of a domestic violence call. On or about April 22, 2010, the defendant and his wife had a verbal argument that resulted in defendant’s wife seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) when the defendant threatened he was going to ‘shoot his wife.’  The arrest and weapons seized resulted from a search for the alleged gun the defendant was to shoot his wife with.  The TRO search revealed two rifle rounds, a butterfly knife and a switchblade.   The knives were found in a box against the wall with a pile of other boxes with either a ‘knife’ label or picture thereon.  Prior to trial the defendant’s motion to suppress the knives found from the TRO search was denied. He was subsequently convicted of these weapons offenses.

            On appeal the Appellate Court reversed the weapons convictions based on several errors of the trial court. The Appellate Division found the search violated N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28j and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution that require “probable cause.”  The court further relied upon  State v. Masculin, 355 N.J. Super. 250 (Ch. Div. 2002), which established the immediate apparent illegality doctrine.  The court’s inquiry addressed whether, when the officer seized the box with the weapons in them, was it ‘immediately apparent’ to that officer that the weapons were illegal. Id. at 586-87.  The court ruled that, based on the record, the State failed the “immediately apparent” test and the trial court should have suppressed the weapons.  The second plain error requiring reversal was the jury charge on terroristic threats.  The Appellate Court determined when the trial court included “kicking” and “punching” in the same charge as “shooting” and “killing” the jury was allowed to convict the defendant of terroristic threats to commit a simple assault.

This decision by the Appellate Division reaffirms that search and seizure of weapons under a domestic violence warrant limits evidence in a subsequent criminal trial to the “immediately apparent or whether a further search was required to determine illegality” as established in Harris. State v. Harris, 211 N.J. 566, 587 (2012). The record in State v. Rainmondo indicates the police were looking for guns, not knives and unsure if the knives were illegal. The knives found in Defendant Raimondo’s residence were not immediately apparent to the police and therefore not admissible in the subsequent criminal which was unrelated to the search for a gun which was the sole basis of the TRO and TRO search.

Pubished by domestic violence criminal lawyer, Jeffrey Hark.

Summary - 14-2-0509 State v. Marcano, App. Div. Docket No. A-1021-12T3

Summary of the prescription drug case involving professional license defense.
 
In the recent July 2, 2013 decision in State v. Marcano by the New Jersey Appellate Division, the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony by a key witness against the defendant, Frances Marcano. On October 26, 2010, Dr. Tadeusz Majchrazak reported to Jersey City Police that Marcano presented a pharmacy with a prescription for Percocet on Majchrazak’s prescription script that Dr. Majchrazak did not prescribe to the defendant. A few days before the forged script was presented to the pharmacy, the defendant had requested Dr. Majchrazak to prescribe Percocet and Dr. Majchrazak refused since the defendant was seeing a pain management specialist for pain.

Statute N.J.A.C. 13:45A-27.(d) required Dr. Majchrazak to report the forgery to the authorities, however the defendant argued that the conversations days before the forgery with Dr. Majchrazak were privilege and filed a motion in limine. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to limit Dr. Majchrazak from testifying to the conversations days before the forged script was presented to the pharmacy. The trial court found that public policy wanted to protect the doctor-patient privilege to keep lines of communication open and prevent a possible chilling effect if the doctor was to report prior conversations with the defendant regarding the medication. The trial court was not satisfied the defendant’s prior conversations with the doctor were “in furtherance of a criminal purpose.” People v. Sinski, 669 N.E. 2d 809 (N.Y. 1996).

The Appellate Court reversed, finding that the physician-patient privilege does not bar defendant's doctor from testifying regarding defendant's efforts to obtain a prescription for Percocet during an office visit. Privileges are statutory creations that advance a societal interest, but are narrowly construed. State v. Schreiber, 122 N.J. 579, 582 (1991). When the privilege is faced against other competing rights, the Court finds “the privilege yields.” State v. Marcano, (App. Div. 2013). The Court’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-17 is that information communicated to a practitioner to unlawfully procure administration of a controlled dangerous substance shall not be a privileged communication. The trial court believed Marcano’s efforts to have his doctor prescribe Percocet was not unlawful; only Marcano’s efforts when he presented a forged script were unlawful. The Appellate Court decided that Marcano’s efforts to have the doctor to prescribe Percocet were unlawful therefore lowering the standard that bars a conversation under physician-patient privilege.
 
Prescription drug case summarized by New Jersey Drug Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark.
 

 

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

Charitable Immunity Case Outline


Three prong test to determine if Charitable Immunity Act is applicable:

1) the entity is a non-profit;

2) was organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and

3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury. 

 
Prong three is further broken down to determine a party is a beneficiary of the “works” of a charity, under the Charity Immunity Act:

(1) the institution pleading the immunity, at the time in question, was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance, and

(2) the injured party must have been a direct recipient of those good works.

Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 815 A.2d 419 (2003).
 
Courts have a broad interpretation of function although a church's main purpose may be to provide a place of worship and spiritual guidance, [its] function is not so narrowly confined. It is not limited to sectarian teaching and worship. In [the] modern view, exercises designed to aid in the advancement of the spiritual, moral ethical and cultural life of the community in general are deemed within the purview of the religious society. A social center is now commonly regarded as a proper adjunct of the local church-conducive to the public good, as well as advantageous to the congregation.”  Loder v. St. Thomas Greek Orthodox Church, 295 N.J. Super. 297, 302, 685 A.2d 20, 23 (App. Div. 1996).

However, the Court limits function in Beicht v. American Polish Veterans, Inc., the renting of a space for a bridal shower was “unrelated” and the entity was not protected by the Charitable Immunities Act. When the organization makes its premises available for an activity unrelated to such an undertaking, it is not functioning within the parameters of its immunity.”  Beicht v. Am. Polish Veterans, Inc., 259 N.J. Super. 79, 81, 611 A.2d 168, 169 (Ch. Div. 1992). In Beicht v. Am. Polish Veterans, 259 N.J.Super. 79, 82 (Law Div.1992) (denying charitable immunity to a fraternal organization because “[f]raternal societies or those organizations whose purpose is to promote the welfare of their members are benevolent, but not charitable”).

In Loder, the event was a sponsored event and in Beicht, the event was non-affiliated and unrelated with the entity.

Was the event Felicia Cannon attended an affiliated event of St. Anthony’s? Was the event at St. Anthony’s a church sponsored event?

Other than being called a Christmas party were religious or charitable elements present?

Did invitees pray? Were blessings exchanged before consuming alcohol? If a youtube of this party was compared to a youtube of a party at a private club would there be any difference?

Does St. Anthony’s have 503(c)1 status? Federally funded? State funded?

If the event was NOT affiliated or sponsored the Act does not apply.

Even if the event was affiliated, immunity should not be granted to St. Anthony’s. This event lasted until about 1 am, when police ended the event due to fights; the behavior exhibited at the event was not conducive to the social good, advantageous to the church, or aiding in the advancement of the cultural life of the community. Therefore, the event should be considered outside the very broad and accommodating function the Court has set forth in case law rather than rewarding behavior clearly against the public policy of the Act.

If an organization falls under Charitable Immunity Act, three possible exemptions to immunity; 1) gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct; 2) employment law claims are not protected by immunity laws; and 3) charitable immunity does not apply in lawsuits alleging sexual abuse.

Illegal behavior and unlicensed alcohol does not bar protection under the Charitable Immunity Act. In Orzech v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 411 N.J.Super. 198, 985 A.2d 189 (A.D.2009), student's conduct in violating university's alcohol policy by holding a party in dormitory in which alcohol was served to minors did not alter student's status as a beneficiary of university, and thus university was entitled to charitable immunity in family's wrongful death claim against university after student fell out of dormitory window while intoxicated and died.

Source of revenue, fees compared to donations, does not determine charitable status. Auerbach v. Jersey Wahoos Swim, 368 N.J.Super. 403. (App. Div. 2004). However, if non-profit is simply a conduit for governemnt funds such as a quasi-public sponsor of federally funded housing project, (Parker v. St. Stephen's Urban Development Corp., Inc., 243 N.J.Super. 317 (A.D.1990))  was not a private charity entitled to charitable immunity status.
 
Posted by criminal law attorney, Jeffrey Hark

Monday, July 1, 2013

New Jersey Overdose Prevention Act

Read about the recently passed Overdoes Protection Act and how it may impact you if you have recently been charged with a drug crime in New Jersey.

Posted by New Jersey Drug Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark

Monday, June 17, 2013

N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families, Div of Youth & Family Servs. V. I.S. A-81-11

Posted by: New Jersey sex crime defense lawyer, Jeffery Hark
The recent decision in N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families, Div of Youth & Family Servs. V. I.S. A-81-11 by the NJ Supreme Court reversed and affirmed in part the Appellate Division’s decision in upholding the use of Title 9 for the removal of two twins from their biological mother, I.S. The biological mother volunteered to have her daughters placed in a residential care facility however the court could not find a finding of neglect and abuse as required under Title 9, N.J.S.A 9:6-8.21 necessary for the court to have jurisdiction to remove the children.

However under Title 30, N.J.S.A 30:4C-12, there need not be a finding of neglect and abuse to have the children removed. The trial court erred in not dismissing the Title 9 Complaint and instead should have relied on Title 30 for jurisdiction. Title 30 is an acceptable alternative to Title 9 for removal proceedings when there is no abuse or neglect. The trial court’s finding that the children become wards of the state was reasonable and affirmed, however the expansion in direct opposition of the plain language and Legislative intent of Title 9 was reversed.

The Supreme Court did not find an error with the consolidation of the Title 30 actions and the Family Court custody matters. Although Title 30 and custody matters are usually separate, here in this case since the consolidation was harmless, consolidation was not inappropriate.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

New Jersey Blood Alcohol Testing Equipment

Published by New Jersey DUI Lawyer, Jeffery Hark
http://www.harklawnj.com/new-jersey-dwi-lawyer/

The equipment used to test drivers for their alcohol level at the 561 police stations around the state of New Jersey, the Alcotest, is to be replaced according to the  state attorney general says in court papers.  Why, after so much controversy??? Because the machine’s manufacturer, Draeger Safety Diagnostics of Irving, Texas, will warranty it for only three more years, a replacement technology will have to be put in place by 2016.  In the meantime, the Attorney General’s Office has asked the Supreme Court to relax the controls on Alcotest that it set down in State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008), the seminal ruling that found the device scientifically reliable as evidence in DWI cases.

That would allow the state to devote its resources to finding a new machine.  The state’s disclosure that Alcotest is approaching its “sunset” came after two defense lawyers filed a March 15 motion in aid of litigants’ rights claiming the online database of Alcotest readings, required to be maintained under Chun, is faulty and incomplete.  They also take issue with the state’s fees for use of the database, which range from $5 to 60 depending on number of reports requested and the attorneys have ask the court to order the state to implement a series of revisions to the Alcotest software that were mandated by Chun.

Robyn Mitchell, Deputy Attorney General, concedes that numerous discrepancies exist between the numbers in the online database and the raw data, citing the database’s filtering out of exceptional files. Mitchell describes in detail the technical difficulties the state had in creating the online database.  Mitchell says the state's decision to retire Alcotest comes after it was unable to work with Draeger Safety to make programming revisions that would facilitiate uploading of data from machines in police departments around the state to a centralized database as mandated in Chun.

Draeger hired a software developer, Ayoka Systems, to work on that job. Draeger advised the state in November 2012 that it was not willing to continue employing Ayoka, according to Mitchell. Draeger wanted the state to retain Ayoka or another software company directly, or do the work in-house. But the state lacked the resources to do the work itself and said it would have to put the work out to bid, which would cause a delay of six to nine months.

"In light of Draeger's decision to stop supporting the existing Alcotest 7110 instruments at the end of 2016 and the state's lack of a direct business relationship with Ayoka, the time that it would take [to make the necessary software changes] will likely be comparable to the time it would take to implement a new breath testing program," Mitchell says. "Given that the Alcotest 7110 will become obsolete at the end of 2016, it makes more sense for the state to focus its attention and resources on replacing the Alcotest 7110."

As a result by 2016 the State of New Jersey will be attempting to implement a new breath testing system to replace the Alcotest system that it fought so hard to have implemented only a few years ago.  The Alcotester replaced the 1950 era breathalyzer which was used for over 40 years in New Jersey to convict drivers of DWI and DUI.

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

State v. DeSantis - Issue Statute of Limitations for Distribution of Illegal Illegal Porn Videos In NJ For a Sex Crimes Prosecution


The New Jersey Appellate Division has reiterated  that the statute of limitations for the prosecutions of distributions of illegal pornography commences on the date the defendant actually distributed same, not the date of the age of the minors or the date the photos were taken.  The child pornography statute specifically reads that the time to prosecute expires, if a victim is below the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, to either five years after the victim attains the age of eighteen or two years after the victim discovers the offense, whichever is later.  In State v. DeSantis, App. Div.  Defendant was indicted and charged with four counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child (distribution of child pornography) and fourth-degree endangering the welfare of a child (possession of child pornography). Defendant contends that the trial judge erred by not granting his motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations period. The appellate panel disagrees. If a victim is below the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, the limitation period expands to either five years after the victim attains the age of eighteen or two years after the victim discovers the offense, whichever is later. Here, the limitations period is five years. The photographs were many years old. The panel does not accept defendant's reading into the statute a limitation provision of two years after discovery by law enforcement officers of the offense. Nor does the panel interpret the statute to measure the limitation period on the age of the actual unknown children depicted.
 

Submitted by Child Pornography Defense Attorney, Jeffrey Hark

         

Capers v. Governor of New Jersey, Third Cir. (per curiam) (8 pp.)


FEDERAL COURT CRIMINAL LAW — CORRECTIONS

Capers v. Governor of New Jersey, Third Cir. (per curiam) (8 pp.)

 
Submitted by New Jersey Sex Crime Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark

The 3RD CIRCUIT HAS affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a  CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S TRANSFER TO THE Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. 


Plaintiff, a state prison inmate, appeals the District Court's dismissal of his complaint asserting violations of his civil rights arising out of his incarceration at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. The court affirms the dismissal of his claims regarding the posting of his name on the sex offender registry, his transfer to the ADTC, and the denial of his request to be transferred out of the ADTC as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The dismissal of his Eighth amendment claims of inadequate medical treatment is affirmed because, inter alia, he failed to allege that anyone at the ADTC acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The dismissal of his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim is affirmed in part and reversed in part because his allegation that he has lost work credits and special privileges for failing to participate in treatment does not rise to the requisite level of compulsion to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment violation and, to the extent that Capers is seeking damages for already-lost commutation time due to his refusal to participate in treatment, his § 1983 claim is barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, but  to the extent that he seeks an injunction to prevent future losses of commutation time, he might be able to proceed and his complaint provides adequate notice of his claim. [Filed May 7, 2013]  The message to take from this decision, again, based on the long line of cases involving civil commitment and sex offender registry, is that once the defendant pleads guilty and or is found guilty, the court’s imposition of the Megan’s Law’s requirements will not be disturbed by any appellate court and the defendant’s efforts will be denied.

 

Friday, May 17, 2013

Timothy Seidel Denied Bail Reduction in Case Involving Death of Millville Police Officer

Submitted by Jeffrey Hark of the Hark and Hark Law Offices

BRIDGETON — Timothy Seidel, the Commercial Township man charged in connection with the death of Patrolman Christopher Reeves, was denied a reduction in his bail Friday at the Cumberland County Courthouse.

Seidel, 24, of Laurel Lake was indicted on May 8, by a Cumberland County grand jury on two counts of aggravated manslaughter— one, "by fleeing or attempting to elude law, did cause the death of Reeves" and two, "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life did cause the death," according to the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office.

The accident, which occurred early on July 8, 2012, left Patrolman Christopher Reeves, an eight-year veteran of the Millville police department, dead after Timothy Seidel's vehicle collided into Reeves' police cruiser at the intersection of 3rd and Broad streets, killing Reeves on impact.

The accident also left Reeves' partner, Johnathan Seidel (no relation to the accused) with serious injuries.

Assistant Prosecutor Mike Ostrowski's recommended that Seidel's bail not be reduced — which currently stands at $400,000.

Cumberland County Superior Court Judge Darrell Fineman denied Seidel's request for bail to be reduced.

The prosecution also introduced new findings by the State Police Fatal Accident Unit that Seidel was driving 70 mph at the time of impact with Reeves' vehicle. The prosecution also obtained that Seidel's blood alcohol content was .16 at the time of the incident.

Jeffrey Hark of the Cherry Hill firm Hark & Hark represented Seidel.

Seidel remains at the Cumberland County Jail on $400,000 bail cash or bond.

The next hearing is a status conference scheduled for July 22.

As a result of new findings, Ostrowski believes the case against Seidel has become stronger.

---

Originally posted by NJ.com staff writer Spencer Kent

Thursday, April 18, 2013

Divided Court Strikes Down Law on Drunk Driving Blood Tests


The National Law Journal
04-17-2013

 Posted by New Jersey DWI Lawyer, Jeffrey Hark

A divided Supreme Court on Wednesday struck down a Missouri law that allowed police routinely to force drunk-driving suspects to give blood samples without a warrant and without consent.

A 5-4 majority agreed that the inevitable dissipation of alcohol from a suspect's blood could not be regarded per se as an exigency that would justify a blood draw without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.

Over the years, the court has endorsed exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, including when destruction of evidence is imminent and police cannot wait for a warrant. The issue before the court was whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in blood was the kind of phenomenon that always justified proceeding without a warrant.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the majority, said no. But she cautioned that exigent circumstances still "may arise" that would allow drawing blood without a warrant, case by case. The court said that with advances in technology and procedures that allow police to obtain warrants quickly, police are not usually hampered by the need for warrants as they combat drunk driving. Most states, she said, now allow prosecutors to obtain warrants by phone, email or teleconferencing.

Chief Justice John Roberts Jr., writing for himself and Justices Samuel Alito and Stephen Breyer in a partial concurrence and dissent, chastised the majority for failing to give clear guidance on what the new rule is. "A police officer reading this Court's opinion would have no idea – no idea – what the Fourth Amendment requires of him, once he decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driving suspect who has refused a breathalyzer." These justices did agree, however, that warrants should be sought when possible.

In a separate concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the hope that "in due course may find it appropriate and necessary consider a case permitting it to provide more guidance than it undertakes to give today."

Justice Clarence Thomas was the only court member who said that a per se exigency rule was appropriate, because the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood in effect results in "rapid destruction of evidence." Thomas wrote, "Even a slight delay may significantly affect probative value in borderline cases of suspects who are moderately intoxicated."

The ruling was a victory for the American Civil Liberties Union and its longtime legal director Stephen Shapiro, who argued for his first time at the high court on behalf of defendant Tyler McNeely. "We know from experience that drunk-driving laws can be strictly enforced without abandoning constitutional rights," Shapiro said in a statement. "Today's decision appropriately recognizes what half the states have already demonstrated – that maintaining highway safety does not require sacrificing personal privacy."

When a Missouri police officer stopped McNeely for speeding and weaving across the road, he refused to take a breath test. The officer then took McNeely to a hospital for a blood test. McNeely refused again, despite a warning that such a refusal automatically resulted in revocation of his driver's license The blood sample was taken anyway, revealing an elevated blood alcohol content level. At trial, he sought to suppress the blood results on Fourth Amendment grounds. The trial court agreed that the case did not present circumstances that would have made it impossible to obtain a warrant. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed that dissipation of blood alcohol was not, by itself, enough to justify a warrantless search.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Criminal Law — Drunk Driving


Published by New Jersey DWI Attorney, Jeffrey Hark.
 
14-2-9400 State v. Choi, App. Div. (per curiam) (13 pp.) Defendant, who was arrested for a variety of traffic offenses and pled guilty to driving while intoxicated, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence of his refusal to submit to a breath test, claiming that significant portions of the Korean translation of the standard statement, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e), were incorrect and incomprehensible. The panel affirms, finding that the record supports the findings that defendant spoke English well enough to understand the standard statement in English, that he understood his unconditional obligation to give a breath sample, but he knowingly declined to give the sample, and that it was therefore unnecessary to determine the adequacy of the Korean translation of the standard statement (which was subsequently revised).

 

Thursday, April 11, 2013

Drug Evidence found in the Warrantless Search


State v. Walker, A-49-11.
Posted by drig crime defense pawyer, Jeffrey Hark. http://www.harklawnj.com/

Smoking pot while answering one's front door, then tossing the evidence when seeing it's the police, creates probable cause to search under the plain-view and exigent-circumstances doctrines, the state Supreme Court says. The justices reversed an Appellate Division ruling that suppressed drug evidence found in the warrantless search in State v. Walker, A-49-11.

They stressed it was the defendant's own guilty behavior that gave the police authority.
"We do not suggest that, had no one come to the door, the mere smell of marijuana would have justified a forced entry into defendant's home," the court said.

Two Newark policemen came to Rashad Walker's Riverview Court apartment, part of a public housing complex, on a tip from a confidential informant that he was selling drugs. They could smell marijuana smoke. One officer was dressed in plain clothes in order to attempt to make a purchase. When Walker opened the door and saw the second officer's badge, he threw the joint into his living room and attempted to shut the door. The officers gained entry. In plain view, they found 22.4 grams of marijuana, 27 packets of heroin, 4.2 grams of cocaine, a scale and a razor.

After Essex County Superior Court Judge Stephen Bernstein denied his motion to suppress, Walker pleaded guilty to multiple drug offenses but preserved his right to appeal the motion denial. The Appellate Division reversed.At the Supreme Court, the state relied heavily on the reliability of the informant, who had provided valuable tips on at least 10 prior occasions.

The court said that was not enough to justify a warrantless search, but Walker's actions were.
"Although the information contained in the tip was uncorroborated, by the time the officers knocked at the door of defendant's apartment, subsequent events, created by defendant's own actions, established probable cause and exigent circumstances which justified an entry into defendant's apartment," wrote Judge Ariel Rodriguez for the court.

"Clearly, defendant must have been aware that the officers knew he was committing an offense," Rodriguez said. And once he threw the joint back into the living room and tried to shut the door, the officers "were compelled to act to prevent defendant from disposing of the marijuana cigarette, or eluding the officers."

Judge Mary Catherine Cuff did not participate in the otherwise unanimous decision.
Assistant Deputy Public Defender Amira Scurato, Walker's attorney on the appeal, says the ruling, being limited to its facts, "doesn't change the overall landscape regarding privacy in one's own house," she says.

Officials from the Division of Criminal Justice did not return a reporter's call

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Dram Shop Defense


Today the  New Jersey Appellate Division ruled in the case Halvorsen vs. Villimil A-1306-11 addressing plaintiff evidentiary burden to produce eye witnesses under New Jersey’s Dram Shop statute.  The court opined that the lack of eye witness testimony is not fatal to plaintiff’s claim and would not entitle defendant to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. In fact, the court stated quit the opposite.  It ruled that if direct and circumstantial evidence combined with an expert report established a record that would allow a jury to reasonably and legitimately deduce that a dram shop defendant served a patron when he was visibly intoxicated that matter should proceed to a jury for their factual determination.
Submitted by truck accident attorney, Jeffrey Hark.

Thursday, February 28, 2013

25 People Arrested in NJ Child Porn Sting

25 People Arrested in NJ Child Porn Sting

The suspect's range in age from 17 to 66 years old.



Posted by: Sex Crime Attorney, Jeffery Hark on behalf of NBC10 Philadelphia

After a three-month investigation, officials arrested more than two dozen men in a statewide child pornography sweep called

NBC10.com - Monique Braxton

After a three-month investigation, officials arrested more than two dozen men in a statewide child pornography sweep called "Operation Ever Vigilant." The suspects had sexually explicit videos of children on their computers and distributed them to others, according to New Jersey Attorney General Jeffrey Chiesa. NBC10's Monique Braxton reports.
 
Twenty-five people were arrested last week on child pornography charges in New Jersey.
The child porn sweep, dubbed Operation Ever Vigilant, began three months ago with a focus on uncovering the distribution of videos and other illegal materials.
New Jersey State Police announced this morning that 25 arrests were made with the suspects ranging in age from 17 to 66 years old in 11 counties. 
The victims range in age from toddlers to 10-year-olds, according to the officials.
In a news conference this morning, Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa referred to the children as victims of torture, saying that the videos and pictures uncovered show necrophilia, defined as sexual attraction for or intercourse with dead bodies, and beastiality -- mostly adults assaulting children. 
Of the 25 arrested, five of the men had direct contact with children. Some were even babysitters, said Chiesa.
Four of the suspects are living in the country illegally, according to the A.G.
All of the men are facing mulitple charges.

Here are the names of the 25 suspects:
Stephen Rainone, 27, Louis Cedeno, 46, David Laidlow, 36, Ernest Okhtenberg, 39, Michael Suscreba, 66, Nill Choudhury, 23, James Engle, 28, Albert Fermiano, 30, Frank Fiorelli, 61, Joseph Lorz, 26, Jose Oswaldo, 39, Alfred Bakewell, 64, Moses Garcia, 25, Alexander Ramirez, 36, Jose Holgiun, 59, Brent Aliff, 38, Stephen Anan, 52, Ryan Bronchella, 34, Christopher Brondi, 57, Manuel Sanchez-Olivaroz, 37, Duane Bell, 43, Giovanni Jimenez, 37, William Payton II, 20, Frank Syak and a 17-year-old male.

More Coverage On this Story:
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/25-People-Arrest-in-NJ-Child-Porn-Sting-193595161.html

http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=9009126

http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/02/27/police-to-announce-numerous-child-porn-arrests-in-new-jersey/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/02/28/NJ-arrests-25-on-kid-porn-charges/UPI-71061362034134/?spt=hs&or=tn

http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Child-Porn-Arrest-Ring-New-Jersey-193546861.html

http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news&id=9009225

http://gloucestertownship.patch.com/articles/sicklerville-clementon-men-arrested-in-child-porn-sting

http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/02/27/more-than-two-dozen-arrested-in-statewide-child-porn-bust-in-new-jersey/

http://hackettstown.patch.com/articles/budd-lake-man-among-25-arrested-in-child-porn-sting

http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/Police_arrest_suspects_in_child_pornography_ring_in_Bergen_and_Passaic_counties.html

http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/item/51608-25-suspects-rounded-up-in-nj-child-porn-crackdown-?linktype=hp_topstorylist

http://nj1015.com/child-porn-operation-nets-25-arrests/

http://articles.philly.com/2013-02-27/news/37333098_1_camden-county-mercer-county-monmouth-county

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/50975022/ns/local_news-philadelphia_pa/#.US-AjzCG0Vs

http://www.myfoxmemphis.com/story/21413953/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation

http://www.njherald.com/story/21422606/budd-lake-man-24-others-arrested-in-statewide-child-porn-investigation

http://gothamist.com/2013/02/27/25_arrested_in_nj_child_porn_crackd.php

http://rumson.patch.com/articles/rumson-man-among-25-charged-in-child-porn-sting

http://collingswood.patch.com/articles/four-from-camden-co-arrested-in-statewide-child-porn-sting

http://www.njsp.org/news/pr022713.html

http://www.nj.com/camden/index.ssf/2013/02/child_porn_dragnet_operation_e.html

http://ns1.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/child-porn-sting-25-arrested-in-nj-for-possessiondistribution-of-child-pornography

http://springfield.patch.com/articles/clark-man-arrested-for-possessing-distributing-child-porn

http://www.state.nj.us/lps/newsreleases13/pr20130227a.html

http://www.app.com/article/CN/20130227/NJNEWS14/302270032/Child-porn-sting-results-arrest-25-men

http://njtoday.net/2013/02/27/state-announces-25-child-porn-arrests/

http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/20130228_25_are_arrested_in_child-porn_sweep.html

http://www.trentonian.com/article/20130227/NEWS01/130229681/authorities-bust-huge-network-of-child-pornography

http://www.mycentraljersey.com/article/CN/20130227/NJNEWS14/302270032/Child-porn-sting-results-arrest-25-men

http://longbranch.patch.com/articles/west-long-branch-police-aid-in-statewide-child-pornography-roundup

http://www.myfoxaustin.com/story/21413953/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation

http://news.yahoo.com/video/25-arrested-jersey-child-porn-173404198.html

http://www.newsday.com/news/region-state/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation-1.4719033

http://newjersey.news12.com/news/25-arrested-across-nj-in-child-porn-investigation-1.4721125?qr=1

http://abcnewsradioonline.com/national-news/child-porn-ring-busted-in-new-jersey.html

http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/gallery?section=news/local&id=9009122&photo=9

http://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/phillyburbs.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/f/f7/ff7314ac-cb96-5b90-a5d0-6d387159ec23/512e609d2fe34.pdf.pdf

http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/02/27/25-arrested-in-nj-child-porn-possession-sweep/