Davis v. United States

In Davis v. United States (Docket No. 09–11328, Decided June 16, 2011), the United States Supreme Court held that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct and would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety.

In Davis, the question presented—whether new law should apply to the retroactive exclusion of evidence—arose as the result of a shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on searches of automobiles incident to arrests of recent occupants. The Court, in United States v. Gant, adopted a new rule under which an automobile search incident to the occupant’s arrest is constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains “evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.”

The search at issue in Davis, which was conducted after defendants had been secured in separate patrol cars, took place a full two years before the Court announced its new rule in Gant. At trial, defense counsel acknowledged that the officers’ search fully complied with then-existing precedent, but nonetheless moved to suppress to preserve the issue for appeal. Gant was decided while appeal was pending, and defendant renewed his motion to suppress because under the new law, the vehicle search incident to Davis’s arrest “violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights.” The Eleventh Circuit refused suppression, concluding that “penalizing the [arresting] officer” for following binding appellate precedent would do nothing to deter Fourth Amendment violations.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reiterated that while the exclusionary rule’s “sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations,” courts must adequately account for the “substantial social costs” generated by the rule—i.e., the heavy toll exclusion exacts on both the judicial system and society at large. Thus, for exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs. The more “deliberate,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligent” the police conduct, the more exclusion is warranted, and vice versa. This rationale forms the basis of the “good faith” exception to the warrant requirement, which holds that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police conduct a search in “objectively reasonable reliance” on warrants, statutes, and judicial precedent later invalidated.

Because in this context, all agreed that the officers’ conduct was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way, the Court held that the “absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim.” That is, in the absence of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent police conduct, or some “recurring or systemic negligence” on the part of law enforcement, exclusion yields no meaningful deterrence, and does not justify the price paid by the justice system and society. Ultimately, the Court determined that the crux of the analysis in such circumstances is officer culpability or “good faith,” and not retroactive application of laws. Finding that the officers acted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent, the Court declined to retroactively apply the exclusionary rule as modified in Gant, and upheld Davis’ conviction.

Arizona v. Gant

In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that where there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, the justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement—protecting arresting officers and safeguarding evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy—are absent, and the exception does not apply.

After defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, police responded: “Because the law says we can do it.” The Arizona Supreme Court disagree, holding that because defendant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), did not justify the search, requiring exclusion.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court began by reiterating that the “search incident to lawful arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” In Chimel, the Court limited the scope of such searches to “the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control.” This limitation ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officer and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.

In Belton, the Court considered Chimel’s application to the automobile context, concluding that when an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile and any containers therein. This holding was widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. On finding that this broad interpretation of Belton had converted the exception into an impermissible police entitlement, the Gant Court distinguished Belton, thereby narrowing its scope. Unlike Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, Gant involved five officers and only three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched defendant’s car. Because the circumstances in Gant met neither justification for the warrant exception—threat to officer safety or evidence—the Court deemed the search a constitutional violation, contrary to the established reading of Belton.

The Court held that Belton permits an officer to conduct a vehicle search only when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. Ultimately narrowing the permissible scope of searches incident to lawful arrest, the Court summarized: “Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis.

Walrond v. County of Somerset

In New Jersey, however, N.J.S.A. 34:15–36, defines “employee” as “synonymous with servant, and includes all natural persons, including officers of corporations, who perform service for an employer for financial consideration [.]” FN5 (emphasis added). Service performed in exchange “ ‘for financial consideration’ is a cardinal legal requirement in [workers'] compensation for the creation of the status of employer and employee.” Goff v. County of Union, 26 N.J. Misc. 135, 138, 57 A.2d 480 (Dept. Labor 1948). That services be rendered for “financial consideration” has been recognized as “the primary governing standard defining an *239 employee[.]” Kraivanger v. Radburn Assoc., 335 N.J.Super. 169, 172, 762 A.2d 222 (App.Div.2000); Gross v. Pellicane, 65 N.J.Super. 386, 395, 167 A.2d 838 (Cty.Ct.1961) (“a prerequisite to the existence of an employment status is that there be a financial consideration flowing between the employer and the employee.”).

FN5. Excluded from this definition are only “employees eligible under the federal ‘Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,’ ” and “casual employments.” [9] Financial consideration, under the statute, need not be in the traditional form of a wage. Johnson v. The United States Life Ins. Co., 74 N.J.Super. 343, 349–50, 181 A.2d 380 (App.Div.1962). For instance, free board and lodging or a rent-free apartment have been held to constitute consideration given in return for services rendered. See Britten v. Berger, 18 N.J. Misc. 215, 12 A.2d 875 (Dept. Labor 1940); Simpson v. Vertty, 3 N.J. Misc. 9 (Dept. Labor 1925). In addition, benefits such as vocational instruction, training, and incidental equipment have also been deemed compensation. Heget v. Christ Hosp., 26 N.J. Misc. 189, 192, 58 A.2d 615 (Cty.Ct.1948) (finding that student nurse was employee of hospital even though she did not receive wages for her work). [10][11] Reimbursement or payment of expenses “could also be seen as a form of compensation when others who might be classified as ‘true volunteers' were not so compensated.” Kraivanger, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 172, 762 A.2d 222.

In addition, “even where no specific salary or manner of payment is fixed, the law in a proper case may spell out an agreement implied in fact to pay for the reasonable value of the services rendered.” Johnson, supra, 74 N.J.Super. at 350, 181 A.2d 380. Notably, “employee status for workers' compensation purposes exists if any financial consideration at all passes.” Kraivanger, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 172, 762 A.2d 222. In short, “financial consideration” includes anything of value to be received by the individual in return for his services, but not the hope of future favors. Hawksford v. Steinbacher Packing Co., 73 N.J.Super. 175, 180, 179 A.2d 181 (Cty.Ct.1962), aff'd, 80 N.J.Super. 129, 193 A.2d 163 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 41 N.J. 195, 195 A.2d 466 (1963). *240 [12] It is not necessary, to be considered an employee, to receive “financial consideration” directly from an employer. Rather, indirect compensation for services is sufficient to establish the employment relationship. Pickett v. Tryon Trucking Co., 214 N.J.Super. 76, 81, 518 A.2d 500 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, **499107 N.J. 149, 526 A.2d 210 (1987). In Pickett, for example, consideration passed from Tryon Trucking to a third-party who, in turn, paid petitioner for his services rendered to Tryon, and therefore, Pickett was found to be an employee of Tryon. Ibid. [13][14] In contrast, however, volunteers who act out of civic or charitable motives with no expectation of payment are not employees. Cerniglia v. City of Passaic, 50 N.J.Super. 201, 208, 141 A.2d 558 (App.Div.1958). “It is clear that one who volunteers his [or her] services and neither receives nor expects to receive payment is not an employee for workers' compensation purposes.” Veit v. Courier Post Newspaper, 154 N.J.Super. 572, 574, 382 A.2d 62 (App.Div.1977) (citing Cerniglia, supra, 50 N.J.Super. 201, 141 A.2d 558; Armitage v. Trs. of Mt. Fern M.E. Church, 33 N.J.Super. 367, 110 A.2d 154 (Cty.Ct.1954); 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 47.41 (1973)). The Cerniglia court noted that “[t]he [workers'] compensation decisions uniformly exclude from the definition of ‘employee’ those who neither receive nor expect to receive any kind of pay for their services.” Cerniglia, supra, 50 N.J.Super. at 208, 141 A.2d 558 (citing 1A Larson, supra, § 47.41 at 696).

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Voss v. Tranquilino

In Voss v. Tranquilino (Docket No. A-110-09, Decided June 1, 2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4.5(b)—prohibiting driving while intoxicated (DWI) offenders involved in accidents from suing for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss—does not preclude negligence suits against licensed alcohol servers. That is, N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4.5(b) is coexistent with the deterrence and liability-imposing principles of the Dram Shop Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:22A-1 to 2A:22A-7.

Plaintiff motorcycle rider alleged that, prior to the accident at issue, he was a patron at the restaurant owned by defendants and was negligently served alcoholic beverages that contributed to the accident and caused his injuries. The motorcycle rider was charged with DWI, and pled guilty. Based on plaintiff’s guilty plea, defendant sought dismissal of the suit on the grounds that N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4.5(b) operates as bar to recovery for DWI offenders. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel explained that the Dram Shop Act serves to: (1) make liability coverage for liquor licensees more available and affordable by defining the limits of the civil liability of beverage servers; (2) encourage the use of risk reduction techniques by liquor licensees; and (3) permit a person who sustains damages as a result of negligent service to sue. Review of legislative history indicated that a provision prohibiting suit against licensed servers was explicitly rejected as overly burdensome to negligence victims. Moreover, such a reading would create a disincentive to liquor establishments to refrain from serving visibly intoxicated patrons.

Because the purpose of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) was to bring down automobile insurance premiums, and not to reduce liquor liability insurance premiums or to in any way affect dram shop claims, the court reasoned that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) must not operate to bar negligence suits. The court determined that barring dram shop claims would unjustifiably constitute repeal by implication of a portion of the Dram Shop Act. Moreover, immunizing liquor licensees from liability in such circumstances would be inimical to the State’s policy of curbing drunk driving. In agreement with the foregoing findings of the Appellate division, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that in allowing the action to proceed, rather than barring it pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b), the application of established principles of comparative negligence will apportion properly the responsibility for damages as between dram shop parties and the injured driver.